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China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 18/81)

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

AIR TRANSPORT DADUI CONTRIBUTES TO VIETNAM BORDER WAR VICTORY

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 23 Apr 79 p 2

[Article by staff correspondent Chen Weiyue [7115 0251 1971] et al: "Battles on the Air Transport Line--Record of a Certain Air Force Transport Dadui of the Guangxi Border Defense Units"]

[Text] With feelings of respect for the valiant flyers of the motherland, we introduce to the readers a dauntless contingent of the air transport line--a certain transport dadui of the Guangxi border defense units. The comrades of this group thought of the front and its urgent requirements, surmounted numerous difficulties, promptly transported war-service civilian personnel, delivered orders, and rush-transported seriously wounded personnel, thereby contributing to the victory of the war of self-defensive counterattack, for which it was acclaimed by the cadres and fighters of the units. When our ground forces triumphantly returned to the motherland, the leadership organizations of the border defense units instructed the Air Force department concerned to commend and award the transport group.

Let us first begin with a night before the shooting began in the war of self-defensive counterattack. When the dear ones of the motherland had entered (Meng Xiang), Li Lianzhong's [2621 6647 0112] flight crew of the 2d Squadron was ordered to rush-transport a batch of war-service civilian personnel and urgently needed war materials. The flyers, who for a long time had been ready and waiting, immediately picked up their map bags and climbed aboard the aircraft. In a little while, the propellers turned over and the aircraft took off, flying at high speed toward the front. Smoothly circling around a large thunder cloud area at the half-way point, after several hours of flying they transported their cargo to a certain place. Owing to the changing situation, they were required to fly to another frontline airfield. "We will fly to wherever the front requires us to fly!" The comrades, carrying out the work style of consecutive operations, did not think of taking a break. After refueling, they again swiftly took off in their "silver swallow" and flew all night to a certain frontline airfield. When they had successfully completed their mission, it was early morning and rosy clouds filled the sky. Group commander Xue Fei [5641 7378], walking to the messhall with the flyers, said humorously: "You will eat dinner and breakfast at one meal." While covering this story we also heard that, in order to race against time in completing their mission, some flight crew members did not stop to eat but just grabbed a light pastry and boarded their aircraft, and some flight crew members flew 8 hours in succession and close to 12 hours without eating. In this way, for the sake of victory in the war of self-defensive counterattack, they flew to wherever the upper levels directed them to fly.

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Western and southern Guangxi are mountainous areas in which mountain peaks stand in great numbers like trees in a forest and in which ditches and gullies criss-cross; there are precipices and steep cliffs everywhere. In early spring, could and mist wind around the areas, and the terrain and weather are extremely complex. In carrying out its mission here, the transport group found that most of the air routes and landing points were ones that it had never encountered before, that it was unfamiliar with conditions, and that there were many difficulties. The type of helicopter possessed by this group requires a comparatively large flat surface to take off and land, and the obstacles surrounding the surface cannot be high. In carrying out its mission, the group found that there were over 20 new landing and takeoff sites, and the majority of them did not meet this criterion. Sometimes the helicopter had to land in mountain valleys or sand dunes along rivers, sometimes it had to take off or land over obstacles as tall as a 4- to 5-story building. Faced with numerous difficulties, the comrades said loud and clear: "For victory in the battles of self-defensive counterattack, we can overcome countless difficulties and dangers!" At dusk one day, Yang Fengqun's [2799 6646 5028] flight crew was ordered to go to a certain place on a mission. The mission was extremely critical, and they had to fly at night over a plateau. This was the first time they had flown at night through the complex weather conditions prevailing over a plateau. Because they had made full preparations, they were confident that they would triumph. As their aircraft was flying along smoothly, their radio was subjected to ionospheric interference and they were suddenly cut off from contact with the ground. Pilot Yang Fengqun and copilot Ying Li'an [3602 4539 1344], thinking of the front's requirements, decided to weather this crisis. In close cooperation, they strictly followed instrumentation data in calmly operating the aircraft. After an over 3-hour struggle, the aircraft landed safely at a certain place, when the curtain of night was hanging low. Once, as Hu Zhaoshu's [5170 3564 2885] flight crew was finishing its evening meal, it received an operational order to perform a critical mission. When they had been flying for a little over 20 minutes, there was a sudden change in the weather: a pitch-black cumulus congestus blocked the air route. Squadron leader Hu Zhaoshu, thinking to fly over the cloud, took the aircraft from 1,800 meters up to 3,600 meters, but still could not climb above this thick cumulus congestus. The weather became worse and worse; if it had been peacetime and such harsh weather conditions had been encountered, he certainly could have requested permission to turn back. However, the comrades of the flight crew bore in mind that they had been given an operational order to deliver cargo, and that 1 minute earlier that the cargo was delivered to the unit would mean it would have 1 more minute to prepare and this would mean 1 more minute to guarantee victory. Hu Zhaoshu suddenly hit on a way out of the predicament by circling the aircraft around the fringe of the cumulus congestus and thus in the end triumphed over the threat posed by the cloud. Unexpectedly, when the aircraft had speedily reached its destination, it was attacked by torrential rain. Filling the whole sky, heavy rain hammered the aircraft, which was rocked like a small boat on a vast sea. At this critical juncture, the comrades of the flight crew, without the slightest fear, and as directed by the ground, calmly and courageously approached the landing airfield at high speed. Braving the storm, they safely landed the aircraft. The senior officers, joyfully shaking hands with each comrade of the flight crew, highly praised their brave, indomitable revolutionary spirit and their superb skill.

After the guns of the war of self-defensive counterattack sounded, the transport group was charged with the mission of rush-airlifting seriously wounded personnel. In order to convey the warm feelings of the party and motherland toward the wounded

personnel who had by bloody valiant struggle defended the motherland's border area, the members of the group tried by all ways and means to soften the movements of takeoffs and landings and the movement of aircraft in flight so as to lessen the pain of the wounded. At high altitudes, the wounds of some of the wounded personnel were easily opened and bled, so the flyers at their own initiative requested permission to fly at a lower altitude. The two flight crews of Zhou Caibao [0719 2088 0202] and Zhao Yukui [6392 3768 1145], battling shoulder to shoulder with the fighters, completed many difficult missions of this kind. The comrades of this group were pilots, navigators, radio operators, and ground crew members and also nurses. Every time an aircraft arrived at a place, besides safeguarding the aircraft, together with the nursing staff they carried stretchers and bore the wounded on their backs. Once, after a seriously wounded soldier was put aboard an aircraft, engineer Liu Zequi [0491 3419 6311] saw that the wounded man did not turn his head very often and that he appeared to be uncomfortable. On examination, Liu found that the man's pillow was too low, which increased the pain of his wound. Liu Zegui immediately took off his sweater and gently put it under the wounded man's head. One field hospital was situated among high mountain ridges around which clouds and mist curled, and it was very difficult for aircraft to take off and land there. The flyers, despite the risks, rush-airlifted wounded personnel to the field hospital. Once, a certain field hospital at the front requested that an aircraft be dispatched to rush-transport wounded personnel. After receiving this mission, deputy group commander Zhang Zhenqiu [1728 2182 3808] immediately took the controls of a helicopter and flew off. The location of this field hospital was not clearly marked on the map. In order to save the lives of his class brothers, deputy group commander Zhang circled his helicopter and looked for the hospital time after time, lowering his altitude to 800, 500, 300 meters.... Suddenly he spotted two persons in white clothes walking in front of a building and also many white bedsheets airing in a drying yard. He landed his aircraft and, as expected, it was the field hospital he had been searching for. The flight crew comrades and the nursing staff were extremely happy, and they swiftly put the wounded personnel aboard the aircraft. The helicopter carrying the wounded men safely took off.

The air transport fighters, entrusted by the party and people with an important mission, and harboring hatred for the enemy and love for their comrades-in-arms, soared to great heights and time after time completed their transport missions. On the motherland's beautiful and richly endowed southern border, they opened up a dauntless, unblockable, and unbreakable air transport line.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ROCKET LAUNCHER BATTALION'S EXPLOITS IN BORDER WAR DESCRIBED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 25 Apr 79 p 1

[Article by staff correspondent Wu Jinzhao [0702 6855 6856] et al.: "2d Rocket Launcher Battalion Displays Wonderous Skill in Combat"]

[Text] "The angry roar of big guns!" During the war of self-defensive counter-attack, the 2d Battalion of a certain rocket launcher regiment of the Guangxi border defense units, with timely, accurate, and fierce artillery fire, destroyed enemy positions, smashed enemy command posts, and powerfully supported infantry operations.

The 2d Battalion was attached to four infantry units and fought at (Fu He), (Dong Xi), (Gao Ping), (Guang Yuan), and (Chong Qing). In these battles it destroyed or neutralized 4 artillery positions, 1 command post, 10 strong points, and 1 blocking point. The battalion closely coordinated with infantry operations: whenever the infantry required it to fight there it fought. On 27 February, when a certain deep-thrust infantry unit had launched an attack on the district seat of (Fu He), it was imperilled by enemy artillery fire. The 2d Battalion's observers swiftly determined the position and distance of the enemy artillery position, and the battalion immediately neutralized the enemy artillery with fierce firepower, thereby supporting the infantry attacks. On 19 February, when a certain infantry unit was pressing forward it was blocked by fire from enemy troops defending a solitary hill. The hill was over 230 meters high and shaped like the lower part of the letter "A" bounded by the horizontal stroke. It guarded two important lines of communication. On the hill the enemy had built three layers of defense works--upper, middle, and lower--and this, combined with the open terrain all around it, made it impossible to approach the hill closely. Temporarily blocked, our infantry urgently requested artillery support. After receiving this mission, the 2d Battalion immediately held a "Zhuge Liang" [referring to a master strategist in China's history] meeting to study ways of attacking the hill. Relying on their great proficiency acquired in peacetime training, they did not even trial fire. Using only 10 minutes to pour down several hundred artillery rounds on the heads of the defending enemy soldiers, they instantly silenced the once frenzied enemy's strong firepower point. Our infantry, taking advantage of these circumstances, launched an assault and in one stroke took the solitary hill, thereby opening up a route for the follow-up units. Our infantry repeatedly praised the 2d Battalion: "This was truly marvelous combat skill!"

In order to strike relentlessly and accurately, in battle the 2d Battalion sent out forward observation teams 17 times, crossed enemy minefields 5 times, and braved enemy firepower blockades 9 times to make forward observations of the enemy. During the Battle of (Chong Qing), when the battalion was attached to a certain infantry unit attacking that city, the battalion's observation team was at a highway bridge that had been blown up when it came under enemy fire. The team members jumped from their vehicles and while organizing a counterattack ran through the enemy's crossfire zone and arrived on time at the region designated for carrying out their observations. When our infantry attack on an unnamed hill north of (Ding Ke) was held up and fire support was requested, the battalion swiftly set to work. The entire battalion and another company were ordered to fire in volleys. With accurate and fierce artillery fire, they supported the infantry, who victoriously occupied the hill. When the Battalion was attached to a certain infantry deep-thrust unit that was fighting enemy reinforcements at (Gao Ping Xi0, rain and mist made visibility very low. Pan Ruining [3382 3843 1337], deputy commander of the 2d Battalion's command company, led a forward observation team in crossing over 3 hills and climbing up a 16-li mountain path to the top of an unnamed hill only several hundreds of meters from the enemy, from where it observed the enemy. The rations brought by the team were insufficient so the team members divided the food in equal portions so as to make 1 day's ration last 2 days. Maintaining their battle stations for 6 days and nights, they finally discovered an enemy command post on Hill 505. They immediately reported their discovery to the artillery group, which blew the command post to smithereens, and our infantry instantly charged up the hill. So that the observed enemy's situation would be swiftly and accurately reported to the artillery groups for the directing of fire, the 2 Battalion's special detachments (fendui 0433 7130)--computational, wired and wireless communications, and vehicle driver--worked in close conjunction with each other. The computational detachment calculated 996 items of firing data for 320 targets without making a single error. The wired communications detachment braved artillery fire 17 times, erected 149 kilometers of line, and fixed 315 breakdowns. The wireless signal communications detachment insured uninterrupted liaison by sending or receiving over 2,200 orders and over 66,000 messages without a single error. A total of 20 firings and 14 battalion salvo firings were timely and accurately directed, each time accurately covering the targets and producing outstanding combat results.

The officers and men of this battalion have a vigorous fighting will, and they fight bravely and tenaciously. When a bombardment was most intense, there was no time to properly clean shells, so the fighters, holding the shells, each weighing over 80 jin, cleaned them by rolling them across their uniforms and then pushed them into the gun chambers. Some fighters, overcome by gunpowder smoke, lost consciousness, but on regaining consciousness rushed back to their posts. Some fighters, knocked over by a big blast, struggled to their feet and continued the battle. On 4 occasions, the battalion's artillery position came under enemy fire, but without the slightest trace of fear, the officers and men firmly and steadily counterattacked on each occasion from beginning to end. In accordance with the division of work, battalion commander Hao Yangchun [6787 7122 2504] directed fire from the basic command post. In order to discover targets more quickly and to accurately exercise his command, on 7 occasions he went to a highly risky advanced observation post to direct fire. Under the leadership of the cadres, the battalion shifted its position 17 times, no matter whether it was bright day or dark night, windy or rainy,

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the members of the battalion moved the artillery pieces and vehicles to the new position without a hitch and did not miss a single opportunity for combat. Once the 3d Battalion received an order one evening to shift position and attach itself to a certain infantry unit that was about to mount an operation. The battalion promptly set out and, after groping its way in the rainy night for over 20 kilometers, reached the designated spot and immediately seized a position. At 4 am on the following day, at the order of the infantry leading organization, the battalion's rocket launchers with an angry roar poured an avalanche of fire on the Vietnamese army.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

HEROIC EXPLOITS OF TANK REGIMENT IN VIETNAM BORDER WAR RECOUNTED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 25 Apr 79 p 2

[Article by staff correspondent Xu Guangxin [1776 1639 0207] et al.: "Heroic Armored Cavalry Performs Wonders"]

[Text] During the war of self-defensive counterattack along the China-Vietnam border, a certain tank regiment performed outstanding military exploits and was warmly praised by a high-level commander of the border defense units, who said that the regiment was composed of men who had achieved prodigious feats.

Prodigious feats emerge under special complex conditions but they can also be produced under normal battle conditions. In this, the decisive factor is the spirit of devotion, with great wisdom and bravery, displayed by the officers and men. In the words of the tank forces, "We tankers should have the same spirit as Huang Jiguang, who sacrificed his life to blow up a pillbox; this is the nature of Chinese tankers!"

When our infantry was converging on (Ge Kan), it was stymied by an unnamed hill. The higher level ordered the 3d Tank Battalion to immediately attack and destroy the belt of permanent defense works around the hill and to cover the infantry's advance. Several dozens of tanks boldly and powerfully assaulted the hill. The tanks especially rushed toward the places in the enemy position from where artillery and rifle fire was heard. Some of the enemy's antitank guns and antitank rocket launchers could not be aimed and, together with the soldiers manning them, were crushed by our tanks; some of the soldiers, under the tank's fire, were blown into the sky along with their pillboxes. During the fierce battle, deputy regimental commander Zhu Shitao [2612 0013 3447] and deputy political commissar Li Guangrui [2621 0342 3843], who were accompanying the 3d Battalion, discovered that on one side of the hill the enemy had built strong defense works concealed on top of a factory's smokestack, on the top of the building, and at the lower corner of the same building, which formed a three-tiered--upper, middle, and lower--firepower that posed a great threat to our infantry and tanks. Deputy regimental commander Zhu immediately ordered the 9th Company to destroy this defense works. At the command of Xu Xuaizhou [6079 2037 516B], political instructor of the 9th Company, Chen Dusheng [3088 1653 0524], chief gunner of tank No 907, took aim with his two guns on the enemy firing point on the smokestack and blew it into several pieces. At the same time, platoon leader Lu Jinzhou [0712 6855 3166] in a loud voice reported the accurately estimated distance to the enemy's firing point on top of the

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building, and several tanks fired a salvo that in a twinkling of an eye flattened this firing point. Company commander Lui Shiwu [0491 1102 2976] gave an order to chief gunner Zhu Manjing [4376 3341 4200] on Tank No 907 and several guns knocked out the enemy firing point at the bottom of the tall building. The heroic tankers fired point-blank at the enemy's strongpoints, each gun scoring a hit and shaking the enemy's courage. The 9th Company successively destroyed each row of the enemy's defensive position without the loss of a single tank. After the 7th and 8th companies with fierce cannon fire had wiped out the enemy soldiers defending the unnamed hill and a solitary mountain, the 3d Battalion received an order to make a long-range raid into (Fu He) district and coordinate with the infantry in relentlessly annihilating the stubborn enemy there.

There was fierce and hard fighting in (Fu He), and time was pressing. Battalion commander Nei Yujang [5119 3768 3068] led the 9th Company and some tanks of the 7th and 8th companies at top speed, and in a little over 1 hour they dashed into (Fu He) district. The enemy trained his cannons, machineguns, and rocket launchers on our tanks and fired frenziedly. The tanks boldly and powerfully broke into the enemy position, took aim and opened fire on the enemy. The more they fought the bolder they became: their cannons and machineguns turned in circles and fired at the enemy, and the tanks charged about furiously, crushing and striking down the enemy soldiers. At the position one only saw enemy corpses lying everywhere and flesh and blood flying about. One by one the pillboxes collapsed and became tombs for the stubbornly resisting enemy.

At this time, the enemy soldiers, driven to distraction, fled for their lives in all directions. Could the tankers let the enemies slip through the net? They could not! The tankers, with the spirit of fixing bayonets, followed in pursuit to annihilate the enemy. During the pursuit they lost sight of the cunning enemy. The crew of each tank carefully searched for the enemy through the tank's periscope and in the end spotted a large horde of enemies hiding in a jungle of cogongrass on a mountain slope. One by one the tanks broke into the enemy group and opened fire with their machineguns, bullets splashing down on the enemy soldiers like a torrential rainstorm. The enemies, having no way to escape, one after another fell dead. The Vietnamese aggressor army, which had boasted that it was expert in jungle warfare, had cut a contemptible figure before the military might of our bold and powerful tanks and was in a sorry plight. When our infantry charged this position to mop up the battlefield, they found everywhere cannons, rocket launchers, machineguns, submachineguns, and hand grenades that had been abandoned by the enemy. Scattered on the mountain slope and on the sides of the road were over 200 enemy corpses. The infantrymen couldn't hold back their praise: What a battle victory, what a miracle!

In order to secure total victory in the battle, the heroic tankers were willing to face any danger and suffer greatly, even to the extent of making bloody sacrifices, to support their infantry comrades-in-arms with all their strength. For the Vietnamese aggressor army, each of whose soldiers at this time was absorbed in fleeing for his life, it was a "stunning blow" and, as a result, also a miracle.

During one battle, Chen Zhongjun [7115 0112 6511], commander of the 3d Battalion ordered one powerful tank after another to carry infantry for a swift assault on the enemy's in-depth position. On the way, enemy soldiers, hiding in dense forests and thick grass, frenziedly fired at the infantry on top of the tanks. Battalion

commander Chen, by radiophone, told the infantrymen riding on the tanks to observe the enemy's firing points and immediately direct the tanks to the targets. He ordered each chief gunner to fire without letup at the enemy firing points on both sides of the road, thereby powerfully covering the infantry's charge through the enemy's zone of blocking fire. When the infantry met with fire from the enemy hidden in places unsuited for display of the tank's firepower, battalion commander Chen made a prompt decision: he ordered the antiaircraft machinegunner of each tank to open the gun turret hatch, squeeze through it, and, braving enemy fire, fiercely strafe the enemy with the tank's antiaircraft machinegun, thus silencing the savage enemy. During another battle, Tank No 703 of the 7th Company was hit by a shell and stopped in its tracks. In front of the tank, the infantry that had launched an assault was pinned down by enemy fire and could not advance. Tank No 703's gunner Chen Tian [7115 1131] thought boldly: his mission was to coordinate with the infantry operation; if the tank could not move, his weapon could not be brought into position to fire. Swiftly unbolting the machinegun mounted on the tank, he jumped off the tank and fired furiously at the enemy's firing points, thereby helping the infantry to silence the enemy fire and covering the infantry comrades-in-arms as they charged the enemy's position and annihilated the enemy, who put up a desperate struggle.

On the battlefields, our heroic tankers and infantrymen pressed forward side by side in close coordination and performed miracles in defense of the motherland's border.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ARMY COMMANDER ENVISAGES DEVELOPMENT OF COMBINED ARMS TRAINING

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 7 Jun 79 pp 1, 2

[Article by army commander Cao Budie [2580 2975 1066]: "On the Coordinated Training of All Service Arms"]

[Text] How are we to conduct combined arms training so that the fighting capability of the units will meet the demands of modern warfare? This has become an increasingly acute problem for every level of leadership. In the past several days, I and some comrades of headquarters have gone down to the units to gain an understanding of the situation in this respect. Here I will discuss some of my ideas on the question of coordinated training.

With regard to the units' problem of coordinating the training of all service arms, the fighters make a telling criticism: "Now, all that a leader gets a grip on, from general to squad leader, is a single service arm." This has truly been a very weak link in the units' training for a long time. Why has this situation arisen? There are three main reasons: One is that their thinking has not adapted to new conditions and they are used to dealing with only a single service arm. Once there is talk of training, what they think of is infantry training, and what they think of for the infantry is bayonet and handgrenade training. The training of special troops or the coordinated training of all service arms are beyond their field of vision or "does not register" with them. Even if they train two service arms, owing to the fact that they don't have much understanding of them, they often do not get the point and just go through the motions. This "one-track" mentality has a "remote cause" and an "immediate cause." During the war of resistance against Japan, our army was one of "millet plus rifles" and the war was basically an infantry war; in the period after liberation and during the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, our army had some special arms, but there were not many coordinated operations by all service arms. At present, many commanders at all levels had their "origin" in the infantry. Although they have fairly rich experience in actual warfare, most of them have no experience in commanding operations by all service arms. In addition, for several years in the past Lin Biao nonsensically said that "there is no necessity for combined training at the regimental, divisional, and army level" and that it would be "a waste of money and manpower." This chopped off the coordinated training of all service arms and caused a "one-track" mentality to become deeply ingrained in some commanders. Our army's current training system is basically geared to a "single service arm" military establishment. Second, the training methods are unsuitable. In the training of each service arm, basically

the old methods continue to be used, each arm conducting its own training. With regard to the time and energy put in by leaders at all levels, the focal point is not coordinated training. To put it briefly, there are "four too much's and four too little's": too much training of soldiers and too little training of cadres; too much training of infantry and too little training of special arms; too much separate training and too little combined training; and too much combined training of small elements and too little training of units of regiment size and larger. Third, the funds, sites, and equipment for training are inadequate to satisfy the requirements of coordinated training of all service arms.

How are we to change this state of affairs and transform the habit of the training of only one service arm into the coordinated training of all service arms? According to our initial practice, we feel that there are four problems that need to be inquired into and solved.

Extricate Oneself From The Habit of Thinking in Terms of a Single Service Arm

In the final analysis, how big an effort should be made to conduct coordinated training of all service arms? Leaders at all levels, because their understanding of this problem differs, also put a different amount of effort into it. I think that if we are to conduct coordinated training well, there are several ideas that need to be changed.

Is whether the coordinated training of service arms is done well or poorly of the utmost importance or of little importance to raising a unit's fighting capacity? The understanding of many comrades is unclear with regard to this question. Many of them measure the training successes of a unit by the number of meters a hand grenade is thrown and the number of the ring hit when firing a weapon. As for what the tactical level of a unit is and what a cadre's ability in coordinated command is, these things do not draw much of their attention. The experience of this was of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam once again tells us that, in a war under modern conditions, if we are to be victorious it will not do to only depend on a single service arm. Now, when modern science and technology are changing with each passing day, the Soviet and American armed forces are going all-out to renew their weapons and equipment in competition to develop new service arms, and our army is also developing into a combined force of all service arms. Coordinated operations by all service arms have developed from the era of "cold" weapons to the era of "hot" weapons, have developed from being the product of rifle warfare to being the product of cannon warfare, and are a change in the forms of war brought about by technological progress. To vigorously conduct good coordinated training of all service arms poses a major problem for our peacetime training.

Should the training of special arms and special elements be "major" or "minor"? For a long period of time, the training of special arms and special elements was neglected, and it was held that they were "minor" and the infantry was "major." In fact, if we conscientiously look at the existing equipment and military establishment, this argument is untenable. Special arms and special elements account for 61.1 percent of a company's total strength. There is a high degree of specialization. Their demands are high and their command is complex; the degree of difficulty in coordinating them with all service arms is fairly large. Our commanders at all levels are in general laymen with regard to special service arms, and therefore

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every time there is a coordinated training exercise they often "make an exhibition of themselves" on some questions of elementary knowledge. This situation demands that we swiftly transform the habit of only grasping infantry into the habit of paying serious attention to grasping well special arms and special elements. In peacetime, commanders at all levels must put more effort into the intensive study of knowledge pertaining to special service arms and solve actual problems encountered in coordinated training.

Is organizing coordinated training a matter for all levels or is it only a "matter for the higher-ups"? In the past the annual training exercises for a unit were all organized by organizations at the army level and above. In this way, the middle- and lower-level commanders formed a misconception and thought that coordination of all service arms was a "matter for the higher-ups," a matter for the higher-level commanders. These comrades do not understand that modern warfare constitutes an organizationally linked "chessboard." Of course the higher-level commanders bear the major responsibility for coordinating the operations of all service arms, but the middle- and lower-level commanders must also organize coordinated operations of all service arms. Take a company for instance. If you as a company commander are strengthened by the addition of tanks, artillery, antichemical warfare troops, engineers, and signal troops, how will you make rational use of them? It is not only a company commander that bears this responsibility; This is also a technical problem for platoon and squad leaders. If the lower-level commanders in peacetime do not have the concept of coordinated training, when war breaks out the various service arms will not hold together, and will even mistakenly harm themselves and the parts will adversely affect the whole. Therefore, we must give full play to initiative from the higher to the lower levels and make coordinated training exercises a regular training topic.

Interchange Infantry and Special Arms Cadres To Provide a "Combined Group"

As I have said above, most of the commanders at the regimental and above levels in our army are of "infantry origin," and the developmental trend of modern warfare is for the formation and proportion of special arms to become greater and greater. In order to strengthen the components of the leadership groups at all levels which deal with training in coordinated operations, we should select and train some members of these groups who are fairly familiar with special arms. Practice has proven that those groups among whose members are special arms "experts," and those units in which the leaders have benefited from the coordinated training of all service arms, achieve good results. On the basis of unifying thinking and understanding, we began this year an interchange of infantry and special arms cadres on an armywide scale in order to do all we could to form a large reserve of special arms cadres and technical backbone elements, and to gradually make the leadership groups at all levels "combined groups" that understand both infantry and special arms. By doing this we will insure organizationally the coordinated training of all service arms.

There are now many members of leadership groups at all levels, and the division of work among them is very elaborate, a situation which is not very beneficial to the leadership of coordinated training of special arms and special soldiers. In order to change this situation, we thought of a way, within the existing authorized strength norms of each level at the regiment and above, to change the title of one to two cadres who hold the post of deputy to a chief and put them in charge of

the special arms. Before the authorized strength is changed in this manner, this year every level of our army at regiment and above set up on deputy with military responsibility and a leadership group for training special arms participated in by the chiefs of headquarters, political, and logistical organizations, in order to strengthen the organizational leadership over the training of each special arm and to create conditions for the coordinated training of infantry and special arms.

Based on Existing Conditions, Reform Training Methods Under the existing conditions of authorized strength, how can we carry out sell the coordinated training of all service arms? This year we found a way by reforming training methods, and the results of some tryouts have been fairly good.

First, commanders at all levels were organized to study the knowledge pertaining to the service arms. Commanders of combined arms forces study the knowledge pertaining to the service arms, and the commanders of special arms study combined arms tactics. Both sides should emphasize "understanding," and in particular the principal leading comrades certainly must personally go to the special arm units to try to find out things for themselves, "not feeling ashamed to ask and learn from their subordinates," and change themselves from laymen to professionals. We adopted these methods: One method was to increase the amount of time that combined arms commanders spend in studying the specialized knowledge of the service arms during the cadre group training. In April, during the 30-day group training of divisional and regimental cadres, we set aside 10 days' time for their study of the scientific and technical knowledge pertaining to service arms. We chose the method of "going out for walks" and "asking for explanations," looking at material exhibits and asking "experts" to give instruction, things which broadened their horizons and enriched their minds. The second method was to organize the commanders of combined arms forces to take part in the specialized training of special arms so that they will truly obtain the right to speak in commanding special arms. The third method was to mainly use the weekly military study day for cadres on the job for doing research on enemy armies and for studying knowledge pertaining to the military service arms and combined arms tactics. The fourth method was to make an important content of the training the comparing, assessing, and testing of them on knowledge of the service arms and on coordinated operations.

Second, we organized the commanders of combined arms forces to study military staff work. To be a commander of a combined arms force, one must understand staff work, be able to read, use, and mark maps, and be familiar with the main method, sequence content and demands of organizing the command of battles; otherwise, one will not be able to command well coordinated operations of all service arms. In addition to demanding that commanders at all levels strengthen their independent study of staff work, we decided that the principal commanders at the army, regiment, and division level will this year take part in a period of concentrated training in staff work in order to lay the foundation for conducting good training in coordinating all service arms.

Third, we combined as much as possible specialized training of service arms and training of infantry. With regard to training practice, infantry-artillery coordination was fairly good, but for infantry-tank coordination, because the authorized tank strength is fairly small, and also because of the restrictions imposed by motor-hours and sites, it is somewhat more difficult to organize training, and

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requires more vigorous creation of conditions for the training of leaders at every level. For example, the tank forces must train in driving up and down slopes and in driving over obstacles. These things also provide an extremely good tactical background for infantry antitank exercises. We conduct training by pulling nearby infantry to the tank driving ground and by sending some tank elements to the infantry antitank training points. The shared tactical background of the infantry and tank forces brings out the best in infantry training and tank training, and both promotes mutual understanding between the service arms and creates good conditions for coordinated training.

Fourth, we carried out more tactical combined training of all service arms under conditions approximating actual warfare. This combined training is the main method for improving the ability of commanders at all levels to organize and command combined operations. During this year's combat-preparedness training, in order to solve the problem of training all service arms in coordinated operations, the regiments, battalions, companies, and platoons of our army all carried out one or more live tactical exercises. By having layer by layer coordinate their plans and practice coordinated movements is a concrete method for commanders at all levels to learn how to organize troops and firepower and for coordinating and readjusting by season the service arms. Everybody has said: "The more we train in this way the more lively our minds become, the more methods we find, and the greater becomes our confidence in victory."

The Fundamental Way To Conduct Good Coordinated Training Is To Reform the System

In order to suit the features of coordinated operations by all service arms under modern conditions, the armed forces of many countries in the world today have reformed their establishments. For example, in order to solve the contradiction in which the temporary composition and coordination of service arms was poor, France reformed its military establishment. Some organic regiments are composed of several service arms. Some infantry battalions still are interwoven with aircraft, tanks, and signal communications troops, and beginning with the battalion commander the coordinated training of all service arms is organized. They think that the coordinated training of all service arms is like playing basketball: a temporarily formed basketball team can never coordinate as well as an originally organized basketball team.

Our army's current establishment is basically a single service arm establishment. If this system is not reformed, there cannot be a big breakthrough in training; if we are fundamentally to improve coordinated training, we must reform the current establishment. However, owing to limitations in economic and technological development, it will be difficult to make a big reform of the units' system within a short period of time. Under these conditions, if one can imagine it this way: a field army would first form a regiment comprised of all service arms as an "experimental plot." This regiment would have infantry, tanks, and antiaircraft guns and also small antitank and antiaircraft guided missiles, and reconnaissance, signal communications, engineer, antichemical warfare, and logistical elements, as well as the corresponding command structure and command equipment. Once this kind of unit trains, starting from the company and battalion level there would be combined arms training, the concept and habit of training only a single service arm would be

fundamentally changed, and bit by bit the concept and habit of training a combined arms force would be cultivated in peacetime. This would be a significant way of improving our army's training of combined arms forces and its operational capacity. Naturally, this is still only something to be envisaged and looked for in the future. There are many issues involved in the reform of the military establishment and system that require overall consideration and study by the Military Commission of the [CCP] Central Committee. I have set out this hypothesis in order to stimulate discussion at this time.

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REGIMENT TRAINS WELL WITH AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Jun 79 p 1

[Article by Xu Haowen [1776 1170 2429] et al.: "Improve 'Three Defenses' and 'Three Attacks' Skills on the Basis of Existing Equipment"]

[Text] Can training in the "three attacks" and "three defenses" be done well with existing equipment? The "Jinan No 2 Regiment" mobilized the masses and, by seeking methods through a correct analysis of the enemy and by tapping the latent potentialities of existing equipment, raised the "three attacks" and "three defenses" training, which studied the regiment's experience and broadened the horizons of comrades at the meeting.

Correctly Analyze the Object of Military Operations, Avoiding His Strong Points and Attacking His Weak Points

Can we cope with the enemy's tanks, aircraft, and atomic and chemical weapons as well as its airborne units? This was the first problem that the "Jinan No 2 Regiment" paid serious attention to solving with regard to training in "three attacks" and "three defenses" on the basis of existing equipment. After launching a study of foreign military maneuvers, the unit broke away from its adherence to old ways of training. However, a new problem emerged: some comrades regarded only the enemy's many strong points in a weapons and equipment and did little research on his weak points and how to cope with him. Since training began this year, the regiment's party committee has made a point of providing correct guidance so that everyone is clear about the fact that we are studying the equipment and establishment of the foreign army in order to understand, in the spirit of seeking truth from facts, the other side's strong points and weak points so that we can seek to avoid his strengths and attack his weaknesses; and that the study of the foreign army's weapons and equipment should temporarily stop at the point of studying methods of coping with them. To this end, the regiment set up tactical and technical research groups, conducted special courses in military theory, combined the contents of "three attacks" and "three defenses" training, concretely studied the foreign army's establishment, equipment and tactical methods, and mobilized everybody to study methods of coping with them. The cadres and fighters of the 82-mm recoilless gun detachment [fendui 0433 7130] when analyzing the new-type tanks possessed by the foreign army, looked at the strong points of mobility, shock power, and protective strength and, also looking at its great dependence on technical and logistical support with regard to line of communications and POL, found 5 major weak

points: 1) its loud noise when moving makes it easy to discover its intentions; 2) its wide blind angle makes it easy to conceal a close approach to it; 3) its large bulk makes it easy for us to hit its vulnerable spots; 4) its many terrain limitations makes it easy for us to use advantageous terrain to attack it in a mobile and flexible manner; and 5) its large consumption of fuel makes it easy for us to entangle it so that its mobility is reduced or lost. This analysis lessened our blindness about this tank and increased our confidence in coping with it. During the training everybody vigorously studied ways of dealing with this tank. In order to cope with the enemy tank's great mobility, they changed the conventional training in firing from a fixed position to firing from the shoulder, thus improving their skill in using swiftness against swiftness. In order to cope with the enemy tank's strong firepower, they repeatedly trained in using advantageous terrain and in seizing advantageous opportunities to avoid the enemy's strengths and strike at his weaknesses. In order to cope with the enemy tank's strong protective armor, they found specific weak points and trained hard in precision firing. In order to strike with effect at massed enemy tanks, they also trained hard in fast salvo firing with shoulder weapons.

Reform the Methods of Training a Single Service Arm and Display the Total Power of Existing Equipment

How are we to display fully the power of existing equipment in the "three attacks" and "three defenses"? The "Jinan No 2 Regiment" switched from the former method of training a single service arm to conducting combined training of all service arms, thereby effecting a breakthrough in this problem. In the past some cadres and fighters did not look at our army's existing equipment as a whole. The infantry only looked at their own rifles and satchel charges, the artillerymen only looked at their own artillery pieces, and the other special elements also only looked at their own equipment. They did not look at the existing equipment from the entire regiment to the entire army, and even less understand the total power of existing equipment. In order to solve this problem, they conscientiously worked on three aspects: First, they asked the armored, antichemical warfare, artillery, and other specialized elements, as well as departments concerned, to instruct everybody in the knowledge pertaining to their respective service arms, thereby strengthening the concept of the combined arms forces as a whole. Second, they let the cadres and fighters view tests of the effect of tanks, artillery, and rocket launchers as antitank weapons, so that everybody recognized that existing weapons and equipment can be used in the "three attacks" and "three defenses." Third, they reformed training methods to display fully the power of existing equipment. This year, in "three attacks" training, they improved on the past method of operations of a single service arm by emphasizing good infantry-tank and infantry-artillery joint training; by making a point of bringing into play the roles of all service arms; by dispersing weapons and concentrating firepower, with the company, platoon and squad organizing antitank fire teams; by bringing into full play the roles of the artillery pieces, rocket launchers, and bangalore torpedoes attached to unit; and by organizing fire power so that small groups advance in many columns, attacks are launched at long range close to artillery bursts, and attacks and artillery bursts are integrated. Formerly, infantry-artillery coordination normally required that the infantry be 200 meters or more from the point of impact of artillery shells. In a demonstration this time, they had the infantry make an assault 100 to 120 meters from the point of impact, and at the closest only 80 meters, and over 170 artillery rounds were fired without mishap. This method more closely coordinated infantry and artillery.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**Create Conditions for Making Up for Inadequacies in Equipment, and Guarantee Good Results in "Three Attacks" and "Three Defenses" Training**

The leadership of the "Jinan No 2 Regiment" also vigorously created conditions that made up for the inadequacies of existing equipment so as to conduct good training in the "three attacks" and "three defenses." This year the regiment's leaders took personal command; they set up a technical innovation group and mobilized the masses to innovate by their own efforts over 110 pieces of equipment in order to create good conditions for approximating actual warfare, and thus solve the long-standing problems of "ground to ground" when attacking tanks, "air to air" when attacking aircraft and airborne forces, and "false to false" when engaging in the "three defenses."

In order to solve the "ground to ground" problem when attacking tanks, deputy regimental commander Zhong Deyuan [6988 1795 6678] stayed at the 3d Company "grass-root level" for over 50 days, studying science and making innovations together with the cadres and fighters there. They made a small model of a tank electrically controlled by a dry cell battery that could advance and turn by itself at the required speed. The fighters said happily: "This time the antitank training is not 'coarse,' and the 'dead' has come 'alive.'"

In order to solve the "air to air" problem in striking at aircraft and airborne forces, they made teaching aids for antiaircraft firing, which consisted of model aircraft of various types, operated manually or electrically, that were able on the training ground to demonstrate different angles of flight. Basing themselves on the principle behind the firing of the 82-mm mortar, they also made by themselves paratroop targets for projectile fire. Every projectile launcher can fire at two "enemy paratroopers" at one time as the targets slowly descend. Thus the fighters' training in antiaircraft and antiparatrooper firing is more lifelike and vigorous. The 7th Squad of the 3d Company on this occasion obtained excellent results in its anti-airborne demonstration.

Formerly, when training in the "three defenses," many fighters looked upon the conditions as fake and were not conscientious about wearing their gas masks. The leaders used black explosive charge, wood shavings, and a mixture of a small amount of toxicants and gasoline to make atomic and chemical "gas shells." When exploded the shells give out a thick, rolling, odiferous smoke that chokes people. When the fighters go through a "contaminated sector," they wear their gas masks so that they fit tightly and thus their actions are true to life. This regiment has built a comprehensive training ground on which coordinated exercises by all service arms can be organized. The fighters report that by training in the "three attacks" and "three defenses" under these conditions, which approach actual warfare, they understand the essence of warfare and rapidly improve their techniques.

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DEFENSE SAID VITAL TO CHINA'S VICTORY IN A FUTURE WAR

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Mar 81 p 3

[Article by Chen Hongwu [7115 3163 2976]: "Do Not Despise Defense"]

[Text] During our army's protracted armed struggle to liberate the entire country and establish the revolutionary regime, offense was the main form of warfare and, compared to defense, not only were there more actual battles but also there was richer experience accumulated. This uncommon experience influenced, to a greater or smaller degree, our understanding of the other important form of warfare--defense. For a period of time, some comrades have regarded defense as a common synonym for "right-deviationist conservatism" in military affairs. In the initial period of a future war, even if objective reality requires that we give priority to the hold-fast defense form of warfare, some comrades still would think that only by giving priority to offense could they solve the problem. This idea of stressing offense and belittling defense, although not very widespread, is definitely tendentious. It also is adversely affecting our correct understanding and our conscious implementation of the strategic policy of active defense, and is an ideological obstacle to our investigation into new tactics for defeating a superior force with an inferior force.

For some comrades, once they hear the word "defense," a fixed idea pops into their heads--"passivity." This is a great misunderstanding. Offense and defense are the two basic forms of warfare, and they are both indispensable means of preserving oneself and destroying the enemy. Comrades with experience of actual warfare understand that, based on the actual conditions with respect to the enemy's situation and our strength, sometimes one gives priority to offense and sometimes to defense, and that by cleverly combining offense and defense and by using them in alternation, one can pursue advantages and avoid disadvantages and thus vanquish the enemy. Since wars began, there has never been a war in which one side was always on the offense and never on the defense, and even less was there a precedent for only relying on offense to reach its goals. On the contrary, states or generals that blindly demanded that the offense be used to win victory have left a record of defeat in history. Napoleon, Hitler, and Japanese imperialism all began by attempting to use fanatical offense to realize their goal of conquest, but finally all of them ended in tragic defeat. "Compared to offense, defense is the stronger form of warfare." This thesis of clausewitz' is very convincing.

To be sure, in defensive war one cannot display initiative as fully as in offensive war. However, defensive war has a content in which in passive form there is

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a struggle for the initiative, and it can be transformed from a passive stage to an active stage in form and content. We say that defense supplements offense, or is a means of preparing for and switching to offense. Usually, it is part of the entire process of a war, and we definitely cannot say that in the entire process of war, offense is the main form. Just the opposite is true. With regard to the main direction of defense, in the initial stage of a war, only by making holdfast defense the primary form of warfare can one hold the strategic and battle points important to one's safety in order to shatter the enemy's assault, stop the enemy's unopposed advance, and shield the country while it puts itself on a war footing. If one does not make holdfast defensive warfare primary during the initial period of a war, one will not be able to proceed to the stage of strategic counterattack or strategic offensive with offense as the primary form of warfare. From this one can see that defensive warfare in the initial period of a war is not only not passive but is the primary strategic measure for seizing the initiative.

One argument holds, "Defense can only cause casualties but cannot solve the main problem." Actually, this is not so. In the great battle of Kursk during World War II, the Soviet Red Army, during its defensive stage alone, wiped out 70,000 German soldiers and destroyed 2,900 tanks, 159 self-propelled guns, 844 cannons, and 1,392 aircraft, losses which had a decisive effect on changing the balance of strength. Our volunteers, in the 2 years 9 months of the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, used strategic defense to change the relative strength of the enemy and ourselves by annihilating, in a period of 2 years 1 month, 54.4 percent of the total number of enemy soldiers who were wiped out in the entire war, losses which forced the enemy to the negotiating table. One outstanding feature in the initial period of a future war is that the enemy will be stronger than us, so what method should be adopted to resist the superior enemy's offensive? The optimal method is to depend on the active defense of positional warfare, and by relying on advantageous terrain to display the superior points of our army's inferiority, and first of all blunt the momentum of the aggressors' offensive, and finally vanquish the superior force with an inferior force and create conditions for eliminating the aggressors or driving them from our territory.

In brief, making holdfast defense the primary form of warfare in the initial period of a war is the circumspect policy chosen as the best by our army in proceeding from reality. The implementation of this policy requires that we overcome the influence of the "leftist" ideology in the military realm, get rid of the mistaken bias toward despising defense, and make considerable changes in our understanding, habits, and ways of doing things.

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EAST SEA FLEET DEVISES NEW WAY OF TRAINING CORVETTES

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Mar 81 p 1

[Article by Tong Shiping [4547 0013 1627]: "Training Begins at Three Newly Organized Corvette Training Points"]

[Text] Early in March, organized training began in succession at three corvette training points of the East China Sea Fleet. This was a new form or organized training adopted by the fleet's training department in drawing on the experience of the warship training center, and, proceeding from the reality of corvette units, is designed to improve the quality of basic training in corvette techniques.

At the end of last year, the fleet decided to take the training experience of the warship training center and apply it to the small warship training represented by corvettes, and at various bases it organized and built training points. These points are not part of the formal establishment and no full-time personnel are allocated to them. Because of this, they are called "small training centers outside the establishment."

The superiority of corvette training points are mainly shown in the benefits derived from "three concentration's": 1) energy is concentrated by having all corvettes that come to the points for training excused from noncombat duties and from combat-preparedness missions in order to insure that the training topics are completed on schedule; 2) time is concentrated by, beginning in March, devoting 5 to 6 months' time on the training, thereby avoiding fragmentation and stops and starts in training and insuring its continuity; and 3) leadership and teaching strength is concentrated by forming a work team, which is capable and technically strong, to carry out face-to-face leadership and to pass on experience, give help, and set an example in training.

During the process of building the corvette training points, various bases held to the principles of suiting measures to local conditions and of being hard working and thrifty in training, fully utilized existing training facilities and equipment, and as far as possible spent little or no money. During the preparation to construct the training points in certain naval garrison district, the difficulty of insufficient classrooms was encountered. The leadership of the naval garrison district and the departments concerned mobilized organizational cadres to merge their offices and living quarters so as to vacate over 10 rooms, which were then remodeled into offices and classrooms for the training points, thereby insuring that the training began on schedule. The leading organizations of the Fujian bases, when building the training points, fully utilized the existing docks, training materials, and teaching equipment, and did not pay out any money for additional facilities.

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CONSTRUCTION BATTALION DISMANTLES PROJECT WITHOUT LOSS

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Mar 81 p 1

[Article by Du Rumiao [2659 3067 3267]: "Construction of Project Postponed Without Loss to State Property"]

[Text] The 3d Battalion of a certain engineer construction regiment under the Logistics Department of the Nanjing Units, after it had been decided to postpone a certain project that the battalion had contracted to build, carried on the glorious traditions of arduous struggle, hard work, and thrift in building up the army, and conscientiously did good work on all items connected with the aftermath of the decision, basically completing them by the end of February.

The 3d Battalion had contracted to build a large-scale construction project. At the end of last year, after the higher authorities had decided to postpone this project, the battalion's party committee immediately formulated a plan to carry out the decision, and exhorted the entire battalion as follows: "Implement with practical actions the party Central Committee's policy of readjusting the economy and do not allow any losses of state property." The battalion first of all organized its strength to put the worksite in order. It worked out, put in good repair, and stored away one by one over 100 pieces of machinery and equipment; it conscientiously checked and registered over 1,000 pieces of equipment and materials of all kinds and assigned one person to be responsible for their care; and it retrieved the steel and wood fragments, empty boxes of dynamite, and empty cement bags that were scattered about on the worksite. The fighters, fearing neither hardship nor difficulty, recovered one by one big and small wooden materials from struts, troughs, and mold boards, and even devised a way of digging out pieces of wood embedded in stones. They retrieved from the work site over 40 cubic meters of wood.

When moving the machinery, equipment, goods, and materials, they adopted vigorous measures and strove hard to avoid losses. When they were dismantling and removing the builders' temporary sheds, snow flakes suddenly began to fall thick and fast. Unafraid of the bitter cold, the cadres and fighters climbed to the top of the sheds despite the snow and carefully dismantled and passed down in basically intact condition several tens of thousands of tiles. In order to improve the effective use of materials, they decided not to dismantle the sheds' wooden A-frames so that they could be used in erecting builder's temporary sheds at another worksite. The fighters by hard manual work removed intact and shipped out over 100 large A-frames. From the middle of January to the end of February, the battalion transported without loss by road and rail the large batch of machinery, equipment, goods, and materials in over 40 truck hauls and over 40 freight car trips.

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REGIMENT COMMANDER URGES BETTER USE OF ARTILLERY

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Mar 81 p 3

[Article by Ge Lugai [5514 1462 5556]: "Military Notes of an Artillery Regiment Commander"]

[Text] Should We Promote the Strong Points and Avoid the Weak Points, or Should We Keep the Weak Points and Throw Away the Strong Points?

For a period of time, because we have stressed giving priority to firing on tanks, some comrades think that firing on enemy artillery is not very important. Therefore, they stress that the primary mission of indirectly aimed artillery is to attack enemy tanks. Actually, tests in recent years of indirectly aimed artillery fire directed at moving tanks revealed a direct hit rate of only 1 percent, and its saturation and penetration capacity was even less. Therefore, if we were to indiscriminately advocate that artillery fire only at tanks, then with the existing technical state of our indirectly aimed artillery, it would not be worthwhile. If we can cleverly use our artillery firepower to effectively neutralize the enemy artillery, then we can strip the enemy tanks of their fire cover and can provide cover for all kinds of our tank-attacking weapons and equipment that will destroy large numbers of enemy tanks. Therefore, in my view, to give priority to having indirectly aimed artillery fire at enemy artillery will promote its strong points and avoid its weak points, and to indiscriminately stress the priority of its directly firing at tanks will keep its weak points and throw away its strong points.

The Deployment of Artillery Positions Cannot Be of One Pattern

In the past we learned from the Soviet army to deploy cannons uniformly in one line with small frontages and spaced at equal intervals. At present, in order to improve their capacity to survive, there is indiscriminate stress on deploying cannons irregularly with broad frontages and spaced at unequal intervals; and the control and signal equipment, as well as the means of towing cannons, that our army is now equipped with do not very well meet the requirements of this kind of deployment. For some years, our tactics have always been fond of a fixed pattern, and if there are occasional changes then the tactics only evolve from one pattern to another pattern.

I think the correct deployment of artillery should be suited to the time, the place, the cannons, and the enemy, and the basic demand is that the artillery be dispersed,

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camouflaged, mobile, and irregular, and the most important thing is that the artillery be mobile. The enemy's present means of reconnaissance are rather advanced; if I remain in one position for too long a time it will be easy for the enemy to discover me. Therefore, our artillery positions should be deployed as much as possible in the manner of "two early's, three fast's, and two shift's": early selection and early preparation; fast occupation, fast attack, and fast withdrawal; and diligent shifts and short shifts. In this way we can achieve the following: when I attack you I try to be sure, accurate, and relentless; when you attack me you can't find me.

We Must Be Good at Fighting a Battle of Wits With the Enemy

At present, the enemy's means of reconnaissance and methods of command are both considerably advanced, and once he discovers the specific location of our artillery positions, he can very quickly concentrate his fire to neutralize them. Therefore, we have thought of a way of moving the positions with alacrity so as to evade the enemy's fire. But most of our army's artillery is now towed and has very little mobility. The diligent shifts of position are easily halted by firepower, and if a position is shifted fewer times then it easily comes under attack. Focusing on this situation, through research we have come up with a method of shifting positions known as "leaping over the squares," because without equipment deficiencies we must wage a battle of wits.

Generally, every time the enemy fires he uses a fixed number of rounds for a prescribed square area of ground. Thus, we can, after firing a certain time during which our position has probably been revealed, swiftly leap out of the enemy's "square" and at a nearby new position again fire at the enemy. In order to shift position with alacrity over a short distance, we should have permanent position-preparation teams. When the artillery in one position is carrying out its mission, the preparation teams must be doing good preparatory work at 1, and even 2 or 3, reserve positions, and as fast as possible change the former method of cannon waiting for data to the method of data waiting for cannon, thereby insuring that the cannons can fire side by side and after firing can be moved to a new position. Owing to the short distance involved in such shifts in position, and because the cannons combine to organize well the shifting of position in turn, these shifts cannot be halted very much by enemy fire.

In Holdfast Defense It Is Even More Necessary To Set Up an "Observation Network"

During the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam, a certain artillery unit deployed 6 observation posts, and within a short period of time, by superimposing one spotting report upon another, they discovered 18 major targets. After repeated fixes and mutual checks, the error of the target coordinates was only 10-20 meters. This was an extremely valuable experience.

Now, our units charged with holdfast defense have mainly set up their defenses in mountainous regions. Mountainous regions are extremely disadvantageous for ground observation by artillery, so that even if you occupy a high position, there remain many blind angles in the field of vision that are hard to overcome. Practice in combat-preparedness training has made us realize that artillery reconnaissance cannot be done by a single observation post. Many observation posts should be organized on a battlefield, like a radio network. In this way, what you can't see I can see, what I can't see you can see clearly; and our artillery will be observant and alert.

We Cannot Undervalue Artillery Self-Defense

Now, artillery self-defense should really be understood by raising it to an appropriate position, and this is particularly true of artillery charged with a holdfast defensive mission. Because in a holdfast defensive situation usually one's troops are few, the territory to be defended is wide, and the intervals between positions are large, a jigsaw-like situation readily emerges. Therefore, mutual covering fire is relatively difficult. Even if the artillery is deployed in depth, there is a possibility of it being directly fired on by the enemy.

However, in the strategic training of our units, insufficient attention is paid to training for self-defense, and the units in tactical exercises frequently only train in wiping out the enemy and not in preserving themselves. If this situation continues, we will suffer undue losses in wartime.

The strengthening of self-defense training brooks no delay, and especially since our army's equipment is still inferior we cannot treat this question lightly.

While Fighting a War We Should Also Encourage Thrift

During the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam, our artillery truly displayed martial prowess. However, the number of artillery shells expended was quite alarming. If, in a future big war, we fight in this fashion, we will have a problem in continuing a protracted war.

The firing course of study currently in effect makes a basic stipulation with regard to the amount of ammunition expended, and the standard for assessing achievements is also stipulated. Those who run counter to the course of study by firing fewer artillery shells get lower marks. Therefore, many commanders are habituated to thinking of area, time, and number when firing artillery, as if the larger the area covered by fire the better, the more shells fired the better, and the longer the time spent in firing the better. Even if the artillery is firing on the small target presented by an enemy squad or platoon, the expenditure of several hundreds of artillery shells is not stinted. If a target is fired upon that cannot be observed, the expenditure of shells doubles and redoubles.

I think that the amount of ammunition expended in actual warfare should be determined by a look at the concrete situation and should not be blindly stipulated before the event. As for insuring to a reliable degree that a target has been neutralized, in addition to grasping tightly the research on and manufacture of more advanced reconnaissance and command equipment, we should obtain more reliability in getting fixes on targets and more accuracy in firing data, and should work harder on and make more probes into precision in operating artillery pieces as well as flexibility of command. In short, we should encourage the scientific attitude and oppose blindness in action.

(The author is now the deputy commander of a certain division, and these military notes were written when he was the commander of an artillery regiment--Editor)

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